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APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS FOR THE
MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
D UE TO the policy of protecting mentally disabled persons against
their own weaknesses and the unscrupulousness of others, such in-
dividuals comprise one of the classes of persons upon whom in-
voluntary guardianships may be imposed.' An adjudication of
mental incompetency divests the incompetent of control 6ver his
property, deprives him of many of the civil rights he formerly en-
joyed,2 and results in the appointment of a guardian to manage his
affairs. 3 This comment will examine and evaluate the various
substantive tests and evidentiary requirements which are employed
in guardianship proceedings.
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING MENTAL INCOMPETENCY
Mental disability may be significant in various legal proceedings,
4
and the rules for establishing the requisite type and degree tend
to depend on the purpose for which mental illness or deficiency is
I Statutes in every state so provide. Other statutory classes of persons subject to
incompetency adjudication and imposition of guardianship include alcoholics, drug
addicts, spendthrifts, and persons disabled by senility or "old age." See LIND.AN &
M,\fCINTYRE, THE 'MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 220, 230-34, 239-51 (1961) [herein-
after cited as LINDMAN & MCINTYRE].
About one-fourth of the jurisdictions provide for an incompetency adjudication of
persons who are unfit to care for themselves or their property due to physical
disability. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914 (Supp. 1962); D.C. CODE ANN. §
21-501 (1961); FLA. STAT. § 394.22(l) (1960); S.D. CODE § 35.1802 (Supp. 1960).
But see Schafer v. Hailer, 108 Ohio St. 322, 140 N.E. 517 (1923) (statute making
physical infirmity a basis for incompetency adjudication violated the Ohio constitu-
tion); Note, 45 IowA L. REV. 360, 367 (1960).
Statutes in most states limit the rights of incompetent persons to execute contracts
and conveyances, to make wills, and to institute legal proceedings. Incompetency
may also result in curtailment of the right to practice certain professions, to operate
motor vehicles, to vote, to hold public office and to serve on a jury. See LINDM.A 
MCINTYRE 263-69, 275-97.
3In some states the term "committee," "conservator," or "curator" is used instead
of "guardian." The court may generally appoint a guardian for the person or the
estate of the incompetent, or both. In most states separate guardians may be
appointed for the incompetent's person and estate. See LINDMAN & McINTYRE 239-51.
Mezer & Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycholegal Problem,
118 Ai. J. PSYCHIATRY 827 (1962), lists thirty-one legal areas in which determination
of mental incompetency may be important.
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to be proved.5 Although the insanity which results in avoidance of
criminal liability or invalidation of a contract is not necessarily
equivalent to the "insanity," "idiocy," "lunacy," "imbecility" or
"unsoundness of mind" which will justify guardianship,0  until
recently statutes generally did not define such terms for guardianship
purposes. Hence the courts in incompetency proceedings have
developed a body of definitions relating to each category.
The earliest basis for guardianship of an adult was his insanity.
Early common law courts divided insane persons into two categories,
"idiots" (or "natural fools"), without understanding from birth,
and "lunatics," once of sound mind but having subsequently lost
their reason.8 The more recent tendency has been to blur this
distinction between idiocy and lunacy while broadening the mean-
ing of insanity to the extent that the latter term now comprehen-
sively includes all serious disabilities of the mind.9 The terms in-
sanity, idiocy and lunacy are significant today in incompetency pro-
ceedings only insofar as they indicate that one is unable to manage
the ordinary affairs of life or to transact ordinary business.10 Imbe-
cility, traditionally considered to be weakness of mind and to imply
a lesser degree of disability than did insanity,1 also indicates, in
modern incompetency proceedings, that the individual lacks the
capacity to deal with the ordinary affairs of life.'12  And unsoundness
Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60, 67, 31 N.E. 303, 306 (1892). See Estate of Haywood
v. Haywood, 109 Cal. App. 2d 388, 240 P.2d 1028 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
SThese are the traditional designations of mental conditions denoting in-
competency. At present insanity is a statutory basis for incompetency adjudication
in twenty states, idiocy in twelve, and lunacy in eight. Imbecility anti unsoundness
of mind each justify guardianship in ten jurisdictions. See LIND.MAN & MCINTYRE
230-34.
-See In the Matter of Beaumont, 1 Whart. 52 (Pa. 1836).
s DeNardo v. DeNardo, 293 N.Y. 550, 59 N.E.2d 241 (1944); In the Matter of Clark,
57 App. Div. 5, 67 N.Y. Supp. 631 (1900). Definitions of and distinctions between
idiocy and lunacy apparently were first codified in the statute de Praerogative regis,
17 Edw. 2, c. 9 (cir. 1255-1290). I HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (7th
ed. 1956).
'Dribhin v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 343, 231 P.2d 809 (1931); Beattie v. Bower,
290 Mich. 517, 287 N.W. 900 (1939).
"°See, e.g., In the Matter of Crouse, 140 Mo. App. 545, 120 S.W. 666 (1909); Lewis
v. Lewis, 199 S.C. 490, 20 S.E.2d 107 (1942); In re Wetmore's Guardianship, 6 Wash,
271, 33 Pac. 615 (1893). As to what constitutes such inability, see infra note 17.
11 Barnes v. Waterman, 54 Misc. 392, 104 N.Y. Supp. 685 (Stp. Ct. 1907), afl'd mere.,
129 App. Div. 929, 104 N.Y. Supp. 1118 (1908); Messenger v. Bliss, 35 Ohio St. 587
(1880).
"In re Appointment of a Guardian for Eniswiler, 11 Ohio Dec. 10, 8 Ohio N.P.
132 (P. Ct. 1900).
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of mind, which once implied total deprivation of sense,13 is generally
considered to be synonymous with insanity14 and, therefore, to
signify the degree of mental infirmity which renders the alleged
incompetent incapable of caring for his property or of transacting
ordinary business.15
It is thus apparent that courts generally consider such terms as
insanity, idiocy, lunacy, imbecility and unsoundness of mind to be
nearly interchangeable for purposes of incompetency adjudication.
Any test for mental incompetency tends to be framed not as a type
or cause of mental disability, but in terms of its practical effects
upon the alleged incompetent's conduct of the ordinary affairs of
life.16 Yet the tests generally indicate no measuring standard to
which his ability to manage ordinary affairs must conform.' 7 Ap-
2 Riggs v. American Tract Soc'y, 84 N.Y. 330 (1881).
24 Sabin v. Commonwealth, 233 Ky. 636, 26 S.W.2d 506 (1930); Fendler v. Roy,
331 Mo. 1083, 58 S.W.2d 459 (1932); In the Matter of Application of Jordan, 170
Misc. 734, 10 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1939); In re Nitey's Estate, 175 Okla. 889, 53 P.2d
215 (1935); .Cundell v. Haswell, 23. R.I. 508, 51 Atl. 426 (1902). Contra, In re
Guadianship of Kappel, 242 Iowa 1021, 47 N.W.2d 825 (1951).
Fendler v. Roy, supra note 14; In the Matter of Guardianship of Nelson, 12
Wash.2d 382, 121 P.2d 968 (1942); In re Streiff, 119 Wis. 566, 97 N.W. 189 (1903).
10 Many statutes and courts no longer employ the traditional terms and simply
designate as incompetent any person who from any cause is mentally incapable of
taking care of himself or his property. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-861
(1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914 (Supp. 1962); ORE. REv. STAT § 126.006 (3)
(Supp. 1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-13-19 (1953); In the Matter of Estate of Estee,
32 Ill. App. 2d 149, 177 N.E.2d 15 (1961); Sabin v. Commonwealth, 233 Ky. 636, 26
S.W.2d 506 (1930); In re Blaine's Guardianship, 195 Okla. 205, 156 P.2d 583 (1945);
Wingert Case, 163 Pa. Super. 616, 63 A.2d 441 (1949).
It has been suggested that such terms as insanity, idiocy, lunacy and imbecility
are objectionable as tending to stigmatize the incompetent. Note, 45 IowA L. REV.
360, 368 (1960). Since in modem incompetency proceedings it is practical managerial
ineptness which generally is determinative, it would seem that these traditional
terms could be eliminated from the statutes and replaced by a general term such as
"mentally incompetent."
17 Most courts state that the alleged incompetent is not required to manage his
property "judiciously." See, e.g., In re Johnson's Estate, 286 Mich. 213, 281 N.W.
597 (1938); In re Delany, 226 S.V.2d 366 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950); In re Northcutt, 81
Ore. 646, 148 Pac. 1133 (1915); Leatherman v. Leatherman, 82 W. Va. 748, 97 S.E.
294 (1918). However, it has been stated occasionally that he may be held to a
standard of ordinary reasonable care and prudence in managing his affairs. Muller
v. De Vries, 193 Iowa 1337, 188 N.W. 885 (1922). Statutes and decisions which re-
quire that the alleged incompetent act "with discretion" or manage his property
"properly" seem to imply some comparative community standard like that of the
reasonable man. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 199 S.C. 490, 20 S.E.2d 107 (1942); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32-2-1 (Supp. 1953). Other standards occasionally advanced include
ability to manage property "in a rational manner," Olson v. Olson, 242 Iowa 192,
46 N.W.2d 1 (1951), or "intelligently," In re Johnson's Estate, supra. One court has
stated that the alleged incompetent must appear to be normal "in the usual accepta-
tion of that term." In the Matter of Guardianship of Coburn, 11 Cal. App. 604, 606,
Vol. 1964: 341]
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parently no' set rule can be enunciated that will function in all
cases as, a safe, criteiion of mental incompetency.' 8  Since the dif-
ference betweefi competency and' incompetency is merely one of
degree,'9 an, set-standard becomeg elastic and relative when applied
to various factual contexts, and determination of competency' or
incompetency dependsi almost, totally on the particular facts of each
case-2o, , , .
., , : "EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS'
The -states, are also-in substantial agreement as to the kind' of
evidence which w*i11 supportla firiding, 6f mental incompetency
unde'r- some, gefieral 'test, Although tests for mental incompetency
are sometimes. phrased, rather subjectively,21 the only available
indicia, of a :person's- mental, condition are external;, consequently,
an inquiry into mental, competency is an inquiry into overt be-
havior.22  Generally the existence and extent of mental disability
can best' be 'determined from direct evidence of the alleged in-
105 Pac. 924, 625 (Dist.'Ct App. 1909), aff'd 165 Cal. 202, 131 Pac. 352 (1913). But seq
Cleveland's Appeal, 72 Conn. 340, 44 Atd. 476 (1899).
Improvidence, the 'usual basis 'for incompetency adjudication as to spendthrifts,
does not of itself indicate mental incompetency, though evidence of' it is admissible
as' tending to 'indicate s6iie mental disability'. Where, however, incompetency statutes
are construed' to 'operate prospectively in order to protect a mentally disabled
person from his own future weakness, no specific instances of past dissipation by or
victimization of the alleged incompetent need be shown to justify guardianship.
Arthur's Case, 136 Pa. 'Super. 261, 7 A.2d 55 (1939). "A disposition of mind... which
might lead to the wasting of an estate is sufficient to justify the appointment."
Guardianship of Gordon, 56 Cal. App. 2d 523, 528-29, 132 P.2d .824, 827 (Dist. Ct,
App. 1943) (Emphasis added.) Contra, Lang v. Lang, 157 Iowa 300, 135 N.W. 604
(191). See note 59 infri. ' na
-"Keiser V. Keiser, 113 Neb. 645, 204 N.W. 394 (1925); In re Guardianship of
Wilson, 23 Ohi6 App. 390, 155, N.E. 654 (1926). 1
'
2 Lewis v. -,ewis, 199 S.C. 490, 20 S.E.2d 107 (1942). "The mind grades up from
zero to the intellectual boiling point so gradually that dogmatic tests are of little
value." Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 751, 57 S.E. 69, 71 (1907).
20 Interdiction of Grevening, 164 La. 1026, 115 So. 133 (1927).
21 Some courts stress ,the alleged incompetent's ability to understand and appreciate
the nature and effect of'his actions. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Leatherman, 82 W. Va.
748, 97 S.E. 294 (1918 . 'Such an approach may be misleading as it tends to focus
exclusively on the cognitive, intellectual processes and to overlook the effects of
emotional disturbafnce on 'the individual's conduct. If, for instance, "understanding"
is the sole 'criterion for mental competency, the manic-depressive must be held
competent, Lovel' v: Keller, 146 Misc. 100, 261 N.Y. Supp. 557 (N.Y. City Ct. 1933),
since the psychosis from Which he suffeis 'affetts motivation rather than the ability
to understand.'"Faber v. Sweet StyIe Mfg. Corp', 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763,
767 '(Sup. Ct., 1963):.
22 See Green, Jutdicial Tests'of Mental IncOmpetency, 6 Mo. L. Rv. 141, 144-46
(1941); 'Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of
lIcomtpte1cy: A 'Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14
SYR1cusE L. REv.'564 567, 57 (1963). ut ors
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competent's words, acts, appearance and physical condition,23 and
from lay and medical opinion either based on close association with
and observation of him,24 or, as to the expert,2 5 given in response to
hypothetical questions.26 Statutes in several jurisdictions require
oral testimony or a sworn certificate from at least one qualified
medical witness.27  Absent any statutory prescription, courts differ
as to the relative weight to be accorded lay and medical testimony;
but in some jurisdictions there appears to be increasing deference
to medical opinion.28  Moreover, statutes in several states provide
for determination of mental incompetency by medical commissions
alone.29  In most states, however, whatever the medical expert's
opinion, the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, determines com-
petency or incompetency. The alleged incompetent has no federal
constitutional right to a jury determination of his mental condition,30
and although statutes or common law decisions in a substantial
minority of jurisdictions confer such a right 3 1 the usual procedure
is to place the task of evidentiary evaluation, and thus any determina-
23 Fiala v. Tomek, 164 Neb. 20, 81 N.W.2d 691 (1957); In re Guardianship of Smith,
26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 533 (1927); In re Meyers, 410 Pa. 455, 189 A.2d 852 (1963);
In re Martin's Estate, 57 Lanc. Rev. 191 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
2' Dean v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1957); Anthony v. Anthony,
20 11. 2d 584, 170 N.E.2d 603 (1960).
211 Whether the witness qualifies as an expert is a matter of law to be determined
by the trial judge in his discretion. See McCoRAUCK, EVIDENCE § 13 (1954); 20 AM. JUR.
Evidence § 851 (1939).
-' See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 14 (1954); 20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 850 (1939).
While hypothetical questions are widely employed in proceedings to determine a
person's mental condition, it has been stated that they yield "evidence of the weakest
and most unsatisfactory character." In the Matter of Estate of Mitchell, 41 Wash. 2d
326, 346, 249 P.2d 385, 397 (1952).
27 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-615 (b) (Supp. 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 135
(Supp. 1963); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 201, § 6 (Supp. 1962).
2 See, e.g., In the Matter of Guardianship of Waite, 33 Cal. App. 2d 315, 91 P.2d
617 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); In the Matter of Guardian for Lugo, 10 Misc. 2d 576, 172
N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
2D COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1-2, -6 (1953); Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296,
338 P.2d 286 (1959) (determination of medical commission is "adjudication" of in-
competency); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-604 (Supp. 1963).
8OSee Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901) (due process of law does not require
jury trial in insanity proceedings); Ward v. Booth, 197 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1952).
But see Hager v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F. Supp. 22, 26 (E.D. Ky. 1942)
(dictum): "I do not believe that under our Federal and State Constitutions a person
can be declared incompetent and have his property taken out of his hand ... without
the intervention... and the verdict of a jury."
" Several courts hold that there was at common law in incompetency proceedings
a right to trial by jury which is preserved and extended by the state's constitutional
guarantee of jury trial. Other jurisdictions deny the existence of a common law right
to jury trial in such proceedings, but hold that such a right obtained by statute prior
to the adoption of the state constitution and was therefore incorporated in the
Vol. 1964: 341]
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tion of mental incompetency and the need for guardianship, in the
hands of a lower court judge32
Illustrative of several problems which may arise under this pro-
cedure is the recent case of In the Matter of Guardianship of Tyr-
rell.33 Immediately prior to the hearing, Tyrrell, the alleged in-
competent, was examined for fifteen minutes by two physicians
selected by the applicant for the guardianship. 4 Their opinions,
based partly on the brief examination and partly on what they had
heard, were that a guardianship was needed because the alleged in-
competent was "subject to undue influence."8 5  The applicant's
other evidence tended to show that during the preceding year the
alleged incompetent had spent several thousand dollars for which he
had not received proper service or value8 6
Testimonial evidence to support Tyrrell's competency was offered
by his personal physician, the supervisor of the rest home where he
had resided for two years, four old friends with whom he had lately
conversed on numerous occasions, and several local businessmen
with whom he had recently dealt. 31 His recent business transactions
had included purchase of a diamond ring for less than the normal
selling price and of a modest grave monument for himself and his
deceased wife; the making of funeral arrangements for himself for
$1,000; and a contract for lifetime care in a rest home for $2,500.8
He also held a hospitalization insurance policy.89 He had apparent-
ly provided amply for himself to the end of his days and would not
have had to depend for sustenance on the assets which he had alleged-
ly dissipated. The probate court nonetheless found that a mental
disability existed which prevented Tyrrell from dealing at arm's
length, declared him mentally incompetent, and directed that a
constitutional guarantee. See LINDMAN & MbINTYRE 224, 239-51; Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d
1145 (1954).
32 E.g., IDAHo CODE ANN. § 15-1815 (1948); ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. ch. 158, § 4
(Supp. 1963). See generally LINDMAN & MCINTYRE 239-51.
33 92 Ohio L. Abs. 253 (P. Ct.), aff'd (Ohio App. 1962), appeal dismissed mem. for
lack of debatable constitutional question, 174 Ohio St. 552, 190 N.E.2d 687 (1963).
"192 Ohio L. Abs. at 254.
35 Ibid.
30 92 Ohio L. Abs. at 255. The opinion does not state the evidence upon which
the court based its conclusion.
37 Brief for Appellant in the Supreme Court of Ohio, p. 5. In addition the probate
judge stated that throughout the proceedings the alleged incompetent "followed the
testimony of the witnesses quite carefully." 92 Ohio L. Abs. at 254.




guardian be appointed for his person and estate.40  The finding and
order were affirmed on appeal,4 the appellate court being unable
to say that the probate court's decision was not "in the best interest
of the ward. '42
THE INADEQUACY OF SAFEGUARDS UNDER PRESENT LAW
A case such as Tyrrell seems to indicate an inherent weakness in
the present machinery of incompetency proceedings in many juris-
dictions.4 3 The task of a probate judge entrusted with the conduct
of such proceedings is formidable. He must pierce the atmosphere
of emotional antagonism so often incident to such cases and evaluate
the evidence. He must discern the existence and extent of mental dis-
ability, a task which may require him to pass judgment as an expert
on the alleged incompetent's mental condition.44 He must interpret
and apply a standard of incompetency, taking into account such
evidence as he deems relevant, and decide in the best interest of the
40 92 Ohio L. Abs. at 256.
41 Case No. 142, Court of Appeals of Preble County, Ohio, Oct. 31, 1962.
42 Id. at 8. Even assuming that Tyrrell had dissipated his property, appointing a
guardian for him under all the circumstances seems questionable purely on policy
grounds. Tyrrell was a childless widower with no dependents who had completely
provided for his future, and it is difficult to conceive the harm to him in allowing
him to retain control over his remaining assets, if his own welfare is the determinative
factor. See In re Johnson's Estate, 286 Mich. 213, 281 N.W. 597 (1938) (showing that
an aged person is unwise, lacks judgment, indulges in folly, or squanders his property
held not sufficient to warrant guardianship); In the Matter of Guardianship of Valen-
tine, 4 Utah 2d 355, 363, 294 P.2d 696, 702 (1956) ("The right of every individual to
handle his own affairs even at the expense of dissipating his fortune is a right
jealously guarded and one which will not be taken away except in extreme cases');
In re Guardianship of Mills, 250 Wis. 401, 27 N.W.2d 375 (1947) (courts should be
extremely hesitant to interfere with discretion of elderly people, owing no legal duty
to support anyone, in utilizing their property according to their own tastes).
48 The substantial similarity in both substantive and procedural incompetency law
among many jurisdictions renders it difficult to ascribe the result in Tyrrell to purely
local factors. It seems likely that similar cases exist in many other states.
44 In Tyrrell the probate judge noted: "that his [Tyrrell's] smile at times is not
normal; his eyes do not focus properly at all times; his gait and reflexes are not
normal; ... he is not laying his cane aside, but is dropping it," and concluded that
"these are indications of the lessening of... [Tyrrell's] mental capacities." 92 Ohio
L. Abs. at 256. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Tyrrell's counsel challenged these
observations as insufficient to support a finding of "mental illness" on the ground that
(1) the lack of eye focus was due to a detached retina; (2) the probate judge was
hardly able to determine the normalcy of Tyrrell's "gait and reflexes" since he had
never observed the alleged incompetent out of his wheel chair; (3) the quality of
Tyrrell's smile could have been better gauged had the judge seen him at a distance
closer than that from the counsel table to the bench. Brief for Appellant in the
Supreme Court of Ohio, pp. 24-25. Tyrrell's counsel also objected to the probate
judge's failure to examine personally the alleged incompetent upon the latter's
request that he do so. Id. at 24.
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alleged incompetent whether or not to impose a guardianship. In
performing this task he has broad discretionary powers." A de-
termination of mental incompetency, although reviewable on ap-
peal,46 is grounded so deeply in discretion that an appellate court
may be reluctant to set it aside if a record merely shows sufficient
evidence to support the probate court's conclusion.47
Since the effects of incompetency adjudication are not unlike
those attendant upon certain criminal convictions, 48 it is suggested
that a finding of mental incompetency should at least require that
the evidence tending to indicate incompetency be "clear and con-
vincing."49 A lesser requirement may not adequately protect the
alleged incompetent. Where, as in Tyrrell, determination of mental
incompetency is sustained if there is merely "sufficient probative
evidence,"50 an appellate court apparently need not consider the
proportion and quality of contradictory evidence which the probate
"Case No. 142, Court of Appeals of Preble County, Ohio, Oct. 31, 1962,
p. 6; OHuo Rav. CODE § 2111.02 (Page 1961). Accord, In re Hogan, 135 Me.
249, 194 Ad. 854 (1937); Purdum v. Lilly, 182 Md. 612, 35 A.2d 805 (1944);
In re Guardianship of Strom, 205 Minn. 399, 286 N.W. 245 (1939); In re Guardianship
of Lyon, 140 Neb. 159, 299 N.W. 322 (1941); In the Matter of Guardianship of
Mignerey, 11 Wash. 2d 42, 118 P.2d 440 (1941).
" See, e.g., Miller v. Paulson, 185 Iowa 218, 169 N.W. 203 (1918); In the Matter
of Estate of Grove, 158 Kan. 444, 148 P.2d 497 (1944); Chase v. Chase, 216 Mass. 394,
103 N.E. 857 (1914); In re Guardianship of Winnett, 112 Okla. 43, 239 Pac. 603 (1925).
But cf. In the Matter of Estate of Reed, 198 Cal. 148, 243 Pac. 674 (1926) (lower court's
finding of incompetency not reviewable on appeal if evidence is conflicting).
47 See In the Matter of Guardianship of Sears, 44 Ariz. 408, 38 P.2d 308 (1934)p
In the Matter of Guardianship of Cowper, 179 Cal. 347, 176 Pac. 676 (1918); In re
Kellogg, 196 Mich. 119, 162 N.W. 1032 (1917); In re Guardianship of Wolff, 232
Minn. 144, 44 N.W.2d 465 (1950). Other courts will not disturb a finding of in-
competency unless clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge is shown. Arent v.
Arent, 239 Iowa 737, 32 N.W.2d 660 (1948); In re Knott's Guardianship, 71 S.D. 53,
21 N.W.2d 59 (1945).
8 The adjudicated incompetent, like the convicted criminal, is deprived of control
over his property. He may be socially stigmatized, especially where he is decreed an
idiot, lunatic, or imbecile. Moreover, while direct commitment to a mental institu-
tion may not follow incompetency adjudication, in some states the incompetent's
guardian may apply for "voluntary admission" of his ward to a mental hospital
without following the normal statutory procedures. Where this is possible the in-
competent may not be adequately protected against involuntary incarceration. See
LINOMAN & MCINTYRB 109, 116-22, 225-61.
49 See In the Matter of Dey, 9 N.J. Eq. 181 (Ch. 1852) (clear and unexceptionable);
In re Guardianship of Mills, 250 Wis. 401, 27 N.W.2d 375 (1947) (clear, convincing
and satisfactory).
In a commitment proceeding, it has been held that the evidence must indicate
incompetency beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Matter of Heukelekian, 24 N.J.
Super. 407, 94 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1953).
'0 Case No. 142, Court of Appeals of Preble County, Ohio, Oct. 31, 1962, p. 7.
[Vol. 1964: 341
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
judge may have found outweighed, and the alleged incompetent is
thereby denied the protection of meaningful appellate review. Such
denial is even more striking where the appellate court refuses even
to review a determination of incompetency if there is any evidence
in the record to support the lower court's finding.51 Moreover,
appellate courts do not seem to be highly critical under the rule
that a preponderance of the evidence will support the lower court's
finding.52
Apart from the question of evidentiary standards, danger has
been seen in allocating determination of mental incompetency to a
probate judge, and the requirement of jury trial has been considered
an appropriate safeguard in proceedings where personal and proper-
ty rights may be divested.5 3 However, it has been argued with equal
vigor that since an incompetency proceeding is a technical inquiry
there is no place for jury participation, and that a hearing con-
ducted as informally as possible by a commission of experts would
be the most effective means of determining an alleged incompetent's
mental condition.54
If the adequacy of the safeguards to the alleged incompetent is
questionable where his mental condition is determined in a formal
court proceeding, it is difficult to conceive that the situation would
be improved by dispensing with legal formalities. Moreover, while
the courts should not close their eyes to modern medical knowledge
nor attempt to act as their own medical experts, an incompetency
proceeding is by no means purely a technical inquiry. The exist-
ence, cause and classification of mental disorders are matters perti-
nent to such proceedings upon which the psychiatrist should be
consulted and heard. But the guardianship laws attach significance
to mental disability only if it is sufficiently pronounced. The usual
criterion of mental incompetency-inability to cope with ordinary
or business affairs-indicates clearly that involuntary guardianship
will not necessarily be imposed at the point where the psychiatrist
"See In the Matter of Estate of Reed, 198 Cal. 148, 243 Pac. 674 (1926).
r2 E.g., Powers v. Chisman, 217 Ark. 508, 231 S.W.2d 598 (1950); Fish v. Poorman,
85 Kan. 237, 116 Pac. 898 (1911); Denver v. Beyer, 352 Pa. 386, 42 A.2d 747 (1945);
Nagy Appeal, 169 Pa. Super. 388, 82 A.2d 591 (1951); Wade v. Sayre, 96 W. Va. 364,
123 S.E. 59 (1924).
63 "It would be dangerous in the extreme to give courts of probate (which can
have no jury), final jurisdiction of causes of such vast importance as it respects the
liberty and happiness of our citizens." Shumway v. Shumway, 2 Vt. 339, 340 (1829).
11 GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 332-33 (1952).
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would discern mental illness55 or even where he would prescribe
commitment to a mental institution.5 6 That the need for therapy
bears no necessary relationship to legal incompetency is further
demonstrated by statutes which require, in addition to serious mental
disability, the involvement and danger of dissipation of property as
conditions precedent to imposition of guardianship.57
Since mental incompetency is determined by reference to a legal
as opposed to a medical standard, there is no reason why a psy-
chiatrist, rather than a court or jury, should be allowed to decide
whether in a given case the standard has been satisfied. 8 Perhaps
the most desirable method of determining the need for guardianship
would be a proceeding in which evidence presented by proponent
and opponent could be considered by a jury along with the report
of an independent medical commission. The prevalent tests of
mental incompetency, phrased in terms of managerial ability, may
be readily comprehended and applied by a jury of ordinary men.59
And a unanimous verdict, if required, might in itself provide strong
assurance that the deprivation of rights incident to determination of
mental incompetency has been fair and just.
" See In the Matter of Estate of Guilbert, 46 Cal. App. 55, 188 Pac. 807 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1920); Grove v. Taylor, 143 Md. 184, 121 AtI. 923 (1923); In the Matter of
Application of R.R., 140 NJ. Eq. 371, 54 A.2d 814 (Ch. 1947).
" See DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 196 (1952); GUTMACER & WEIHOFEN, Op. Cit.
supra note 54, at 339; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE 219 ("Incompetency and hospitalization
are two distinct legal concepts determining separate issues.").
5 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914 (Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. § 394.22 (1)
(1961); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-307 (1955); LINDMAN & MCINTYRE 220.
rs See Leifer, supra note 22, at 567-72, 574-75. It is worthy of note that in
Colorado, where a medical commission determines competency or incompetency, the
aggrieved respondent may demand that the questions considered by the commission
be tried by a jury. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-11, -13 (Supp. 1960).
59 It has been contended that inability to manage property, the typical test for
mental incompetency in guardianship cases, can be proven "only by demonstrating
mismanagement," Leifer, supra note 22, at 567, and therefore that psychiatric opinion
in such cases is predicated upon evaluation not of medical data, but of "the same
evidence presented ... by the other witnesses in the action." Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg.
Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Moreover, "in the
great majority of cases psychiatrists of equal qualification and experience will reach
diametrically opposed conclusions on the same behavioral evidence." Ibid.
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